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We investigate wage differences between newly hired and incumbent employees. We show 
in a formal model that when employees care for wages as well as match-specific utility, 
incumbents earn less than new recruits if and only if firm-specific human capital is not too 
important. The existence and structure of these wage premia is then investigated empirically 
using detailed personnel data from a large number of banks. We find that, on average, new 
hires earn more than comparable incumbent colleagues on the same job. But the size of the 
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Dating back to the seminal work by Doeringer and Piore (1985) it has often
been claimed that ￿rms can partially shield their employees from external
market forces and, hence, it is important to study internal labor markets.
Starting with the important contributions of Baker et al. (1994a) and Baker
et al. (1994b), a large number of empirical studies have so far explored the
structure of internal labor markets. However, surprisingly little work has been
done in this literature on the wage di⁄erential between incumbent employ-
ees and new recruits on the same job. But this variable yields substantial
information on the extent to which external market forces indeed determine
the wage formation within ￿rms as in perfectly competitive labor markets
there should be no di⁄erence between wages of new hires and incumbents
with identical characteristics.
The key reason for this lack of evidence is that the typically used data
sets often have only rather crude information on job characteristics. Even
the matched employer-employee data sets that came available in the last few
years1 often contain only proxies for the hierarchical level of the employees
and typically lack detailed information on the departments and functional
areas in which they are working. More speci￿c details on the jobs studied
are known in the empirical literature on internal labor markets when single-
￿rm case studies are investigated.2 However, the existing papers do not
systematically compare wages of incumbents and new recruits3 and as these
studies work with personnel data from single ￿rms the evidence may be
idiosyncratic to the speci￿c ￿rm studied.
We now can make use of a unique data set spanning a whole sector and
providing detailed information on the jobs, hierarchical levels, company, re-
gion as well as information on the individual employees such as wages, bonus
1See, for instance, Lima and Pereira (2003), Lazear and Oyer (2004a), Lazear and Oyer
(2004b), and von Wachter and Bender (2006).
2See, for instance, Treble et al. (2001), Gibbs and Hendricks (2004), Dohmen et al.
(2004), and Lin (2005) for single-￿rm studies.
3Di⁄erences in promotion probabilities between new hires and incumbents have been
analyzed with quite mixed results so far (see e.g. Baker et al. (1994a), Treble et al. (2001),
and, more recently, Acosta (2010)).
2payments, age, and ￿rm tenure.
We use this data set to study determinants of wage di⁄erentials between
newly hired and incumbent employees. To ￿x ideas, we ￿rst analyze a simple
model to develop hypotheses on the sign and size of these wage di⁄erentials.
Firms in an industry compete against each other for the service of employees
who can ￿ll a certain position and are already employed in one of the ￿rms.
An employee￿ s utility is a⁄ected by his wage as well as by the personal well-
being in his current job (for instance his ￿t to the corporate culture, his
satisfaction with the work environment, supervisor or colleagues). The risk
averse employee has private information about these personal preferences.
However, while she receives wage o⁄ers from other ￿rms, she is uncertain
about her personal well-being at a potential new employer. We show that
the current employer will always o⁄er a lower wage to the employee than
competing ￿rms when the employee￿ s human capital is not too ￿rm-speci￿c.
The reason is that risk averse agents are reluctant to move to new employers
even when wages are higher. Hence, ￿rms earn rents in a competitive labor
market even when human capital is mainly general. Nonetheless, turnover
occurs as employees move to di⁄erent ￿rms when they are less satis￿ed with
the work environment. When comparing the wages of employees staying with
their ￿rm with those who have been newly recruited by their employer we
should therefore indeed observe that wages are higher for the new recruits.
However, when human capital is very ￿rm-speci￿c current employers may
outbid potential rivals to ascertain that the employee stays with the ￿rm
with a su¢ ciently high probability and these speci￿c skills are not lost.
We then analyze the wage premia paid to newly hired employees em-
pirically by investigating a large data set on compensation in the German
banking and ￿nancial services sector provided by the management consul-
tancy Towers Watson4. In the years 2004-2008, around 50 banks and ￿-
nancial service companies of every size participated in the survey covering a
vast majority of all relevant job positions in this industry. Including all of
the largest banks in Germany, the survey covers between 95,000 and 120,000
4Towers Watson (formerly Towers Perrin) data sets have in economics also been used
for instance by Abowd and Kaplan (1999), Murphy (1999), and Murphy (2001).
3employees each year from 2004 to 2008.
We ￿nd that, on average, newly hired employees earn signi￿cantly higher
wages than incumbents on the same job. We then study the in￿ uence of
the hierarchical level and functional area on these wage premia. The results
show that wage premia are negative for lower levels but are positive and very
substantial at higher levels where general managerial skills are of increasing
importance. Moreover, wage premia di⁄er signi￿cantly between functional
areas. Wage premia are highest in investment banking and corporate banking
where client-speci￿c human capital is of high importance which is general
human capital in the sense that it is very valuable for other ￿rms.
But to provide a more direct test of the theory, namely that the (un)im-
portance of ￿rm-speci￿c human capital is a key determinant of the size of
wage premia for new recruits, we implement a two-step procedure: Our data
set has the useful feature that most of the employees receive a bonus payment
in each year. We use this to construct a measure of the importance of ￿rm-
speci￿c human capital by investigating the impact of ￿rm tenure on bonus
payments. We estimate this measure separately for about 380 to 440 separate
￿departments￿ , i.e. unique combinations of the speci￿c function, hierarchical
level, and career ladder. In the second step, we estimate the association
between this speci￿city measure and the size of the wage premia for newly
hired employees. We ￿nd that wage premia are substantial for employees in
areas where speci￿c human capital is not very important and for those at the
median in terms of speci￿city. But the wage premia vanish in areas in which
speci￿c human capital is very important.
We also check whether the results may be driven by unobserved hetero-
geneity in abilities between incumbents and new hires (i.e. for instance when
new hires are more able on average). To do this we make use of the possibil-
ity to track the later career for a part of the employees in our data. Using
this panel data set we estimate ￿xed e⁄ects regressions with the bonus as
dependent variable. The predictions for the indivdiual components in the
data set, i.e. the estimated ￿xed e⁄ects, are then used as a straightforward
measure of individual ability of each employee. We re-estimate our previous
regression models controlling for this measure of individual ability and ￿nd
4that the results are robust. Newly hired employees, on average, earn more
than incumbents on the same job, even when they show the same future
performance.
The focus of our empirical study is a within-￿rm comparison of the wages
of employees doing the same job. But earnings di⁄erentials between employ-
ees have also been investigated in the theoretical and empirical literature
on job search (see for instance Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Rogerson
et al. (2005), Eckstein and van den Berg (2007), or Yashiv (2007) for a recent
overview). Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), for instance, show that earnings
di⁄erentials can arise across identical workers employed at identical ￿rms.
In their paper this is due to sequential sampling of alternative random job
o⁄ers.5 In our simple model, di⁄erentials occur due to a combination of dif-
ferences in match-speci￿c utility driving employee turnover and di⁄erences in
the importance of ￿rm-speci￿c human capital on the job under consideration.
Hassink and Russo (2008) investigated the wage di⁄erence between incum-
bents and externally hired workers with matched employer-employee data of
Dutch ￿rms. They ￿nd no wage di⁄erence between incumbent workers and
employees hired from other ￿rms but do not distinguish between hierarchical
levels or job characteristics.6
Our paper is also related to recent research showing that wages of newly
hired employees are more procyclical and less rigid than those of incumbent
employees (see e.g. Barlevy (2001), Devereux and Hart (2006), Hart (2006),
Martins (2007), Haefke et al. (2008), Carneiro et al. (2009), Pissarides (2009),
or Martins et al. (2010)).7 Indeed, we ￿nd some variations in the wage premia
over the years of our study. However, even in 2008 when banks were severely
hit by the recent ￿nancial crisis we still observe, on average, positive wage
premia for new hires and the impact of ￿rm-speci￿c human capital is very
stable across the di⁄erent years considered.
5See also Greenwald (1986), Lazear (1986), Golan (2005), or Barron et al. (2006) for
models investigating the importance of adverse selection in the process of o⁄ers and coun-
tero⁄ers.
6Note that this is not inconsistent with our results as they only consider average wage
premia. In our data, wage premia are negative for lower hierarchical levels but positive for
higher levels.
7For the role of compositional e⁄ects see e.g. Gertler and Trigari (2009).
5Finally, the paper also contributes to the literature on human capital
and labor market frictions (see Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), Acemoglu and
Pischke (1999b), or Kessler and L￿lfesmann (2006)). As has been pointed
out for instance in Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a), labor market frictions lead
to a compressed wage structure as outside ￿rms competing for the service of
an employee cannot capture the full value of this employee. In turn, current
employers should earn rents from incumbent employees which makes even
investments in general human capital attractive. As our empirical results
show that ￿rms (have to) pay more for outside employees at identical jobs
and with the same future performance, they indeed must earn positive rents
from incumbents.
The paper proceeds as follows. We ￿rst investigate a simple model to
illustrate a key mechanism leading to wage di⁄erentials between incumbents
and new hires in section 2. Section 3 then presents the empirical investiga-
tion, in particular an analysis of organizational determinants of wage premia
as well as a direct test of the importance of ￿rm-speci￿c human capital.
Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 A Simple Model
2.1 Description of the Model
We ￿rst analyze a very simple model of an industry consisting of n ￿rms in-
dexed by k with n ￿ 3 and a number of employees indexed by i. We consider
only employees who gained some labor market experience and therefore are
already employed in one of the ￿rms.8 Each employee is quali￿ed for exactly
one type of job J. Initially being employed in one of the ￿rms, an employee
can in principle ￿ll the same job in all ￿rms in the industry. Hence, for each
job all ￿rms in the industry compete for the service of all employees who
are quali￿ed for the job. Consider a certain employee i working at a ￿rm
8The unemployment rate in the German banking sector is 2.8% (2004 and 2005), 1.7%
(2006), 1.5% (2007), and 1.3% (2008). This is far below the national average of 8% to
11.7% in this period. Therefore, our assumption of job-to-job transitions is quite plausible.
6k. When staying with ￿rm k the employee generates revenue sJ ￿ ai for his
current employer. When moving to the same job in another ￿rm in the in-
dustry, the new employer earns revenues of ai. Hence, ai can be interpreted
as the employee￿ s job-speci￿c ability and human capital and sJ ￿ 1 measures
the importance of ￿rm-speci￿c human capital for the considered job J. For
instance, when the job mainly consists of managerial tasks and managerial
competencies are rather general, sJ will be relatively small. But when it is
for instance important for the job to know ￿rm-speci￿c software or speci￿c
procedures, sJ will be large. We assume that the job-speci￿c ability ai is
measurable by all potential employers.9 We further assume that a ￿rm al-
ways bene￿ts from employing an employee when the revenue generated by
the employee exceeds the wage costs.
An employee i￿ s utility does not only depend on the wage she earns but
also on other aspects of the job. We denote this match-speci￿c utility when
staying with ￿rm k by uik. Of course, the employee knows this match-
speci￿c utility when staying with the ￿rm but we assume that uik is private
information of the employee and is unknown to the current employer as well
as to other employers on the labor market. When she moves to a di⁄erent
￿rm l 6= k it is drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
￿2
u and is unknown by the employee before his decision on whether to accept
an external o⁄er.10 The employee￿ s utility is additively separable in the wage
and the match-speci￿c utility and she is risk averse with constant absolute
risk aversion. Her Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion is r.
The timing is as follows: First the current employer makes a wage o⁄er
to the employee, then other ￿rms in the industry simultaneously make wage
o⁄ers to the same employee. Finally, the employee decides on whether to
stay with the initial employer or to move to a competing ￿rm.
9Adverse selection issues arising from an initial employers superior knowledge about an
employees talent are e.g. analyzed by Waldman (1984), Greenwald (1986), Gibbons and
Katz (1991), or Acemoglu and Pischke (1998).
10Hence, the match-speci￿c utility is an experience good such as for instance in Jovanovic
(1979).
72.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Due to the competitive labor market, in equilibrium each employer makes
a wage o⁄er of wE
i = ai to each external employee i. We now investigate
the optimal wage o⁄er made to an employee by his initial employer. Note
that the certainty equivalent of the employee￿ s utility when moving to a new
employer is ai ￿ 1
2r￿2
u. Employee i stays with his current employer k at a
wage wik whenever
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Note that there always will be employee turnover between the ￿rms in the
industry. When considering the optimal wage paid to an incumbent employee
￿rms now trade-o⁄ wage costs against the risk to lose the employee to a
competitor. Although moving to a di⁄erent ￿rm is risky, employees will do
so when they are very dissatis￿ed with the current working conditions, i.e.
uik is relatively small. The ￿rm maximizes
max
wik
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From this condition we can derive the following result:
Proposition 1 The wage wI


















￿ = sJ ￿ ai: (3)
8The wage paid to an incumbent employee wI
i will be lower than that paid to
a new hire of the same ability wE
i = ai if and only if human capital is not
too ￿rm-speci￿c, i.e. when














Condition (2) can be directly rearranged to obtain (3). The normal distri-




















is strictly increasing in wik: Therefore, (3) has a unique solution wI
i. More-
over, the ￿rst derivative of (1) is strictly positive for wik < wI
i and strictly
negative for wik > wI
i. Hence, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a posi-
tive wage premium paid to newly hired employees is that the ￿rst derivative
of the objective function (1) with respect to wik is negative at wik = ai. This




















































Hence, when the competencies relevant for a certain job type are purely
general human capital, i.e. employee￿ s can switch between ￿rms without pro-
ductivity losses, incumbents always earn less in equilibrium than newly hired
employees. The reason is the following: In the competitive labor market em-
ployees who leave their employer will be paid according to their productivity.
9When the current employer matches this outside o⁄er he makes zero pro￿ts.
A lower wage of course increases the probability that the incumbent leaves
the ￿rm. But if she stays, pro￿ts will be strictly positive. Hence, expected
pro￿ts are only positive when incumbents are paid at a wage below the mar-
ket level. It is interesting to note that this e⁄ect even arises when agents
are risk neutral. However, the more risk averse the employee the lower can
be the incumbent￿ s wage as the switching costs due to the uncertainty about
the new job are higher.
But when ￿rm-speci￿c human capital is more important, market wages
will be below the productivity of the employee in the current ￿rm. Hence,
the ￿rm makes positive pro￿ts even at market wages. When ￿rm-speci￿c
skills are very important, paying less than market wages becomes too risky
as agents with below-average levels of job satisfaction will be tempted to
leave the ￿rm. In equilibrium, the ￿rm will then pay wages that exceed the
market level to assure the employee￿ s retention.
It is interesting to note that ￿rms always earn rents from incumbent em-
ployees and they do so even if human capital is entirely general. Ex-ante
(i.e. before an employee has become an incumbent) ￿rms should therefore
be willing to bid a wage which is higher than an employees￿current produc-
tivity as they anticipate future rents. Note that this idea reinforces our key
hypothesis: ￿rms not only should bid more for new entrants as they have




We investigate a large data set on compensation in the German banking
and ￿nancial services sector11 for the years 2004-2008 owned by the interna-
tional management consultancy Towers Watson. In 2004, we have informa-
11Sparkassen (publicly-owned savings banks), Volks- and Rai⁄eisenbanken (cooperative
banks) and the Deutsche Bundesbank (German central bank) are not part of the sample.
10tion about 43 ￿rms and more than 95,000 employees, in the years 2005 to
2008, more than 50 banks and ￿nancial service companies of every size lo-
cated in Germany participated in the compensation survey covering around
120,000 employees each year. The survey participants report information
for a variety of job positions in all relevant functional areas of the ￿nancial
services sector.12
We have individual information on base salary, age, ￿rm tenure with
the current employer, hierarchical level (6 levels), functional area (8 areas),
and region (15 regions) for the majority of employees of each participating
company. The functional areas represent a broad classi￿cation of the main
sectors in the banking and ￿nancial services industry: Retail banking (RB),
asset management (AM), corporate banking (CB), investment banking (IB),
private banking (PB), treasury and capital markets (TCM), the typically
lower-skilled service functions (corporate services (CS)) as well as the cross-
divisional functions (corporate production (CP)). A unique feature of the
data set is that information on the functional area13 and hierarchical level
is quite precisely comparable across ￿rms in the sample as Towers Watson
uses a standardized method to de￿ne speci￿c functions in detail as well as
so-called ￿career levels￿that are described through detailed job descriptions
and pro￿les of competencies, skills and knowledge required for the relevant
job position in an employee￿ s career path.14 These career levels re￿ ect typical
career steps for individuals from entry levels to senior expert positions for
each function and job family, i.e. employees are typically promoted to the
next career level. In a next step these career levels are matched to the huge
number of functions and disciplines that can be identi￿ed in the ￿nancial
services sector resulting in four di⁄erent career ladders: one for management
positions and three for individual expert positions (professional, sales and
support).
12Executive and senior management positions are excluded. Also trainees and appren-
tices are not part of the sample.
13A functional area comprises a large number of speci￿c functions.
14For expert positions, typical dimensions that are applied comprise professional skills,
customer and process/business strategy orientation, problem-solving and communication
skills, and teamwork and networking skills.
11We can distinguish six hierarchical levels in the data set, where level 1
denotes the lowest level, typically the entry positions of university graduates,
and level 6 the highest level, typically divisional heads. Most of the employees
belong to levels 2, 3, and 4. Only 2.5% hold the highest positions in the data
set. The average proportion of newly hired employees ranges from 1.5% in
2004 to 2.4% in 2008 (see table A1 in the appendix for . The mean age of
incumbents (new hires) in the sample is about 40 years (33 years). About
34% of all employees work in the retail banking area, followed by about 25%
in both the cross-divisional support functions like e.g. HR, legal, ￿nance
and accounting (corporate production) and the lower-skilled service functions
including mostly back-o¢ ce positions (corporate services). About 2% can be
assigned to asset management and investment banking positions.15
3.2 Wage Premia
As a starting point consider the OLS baseline regression results reported
in table 1. The dependent variable is the logarithm of wage (base salary)
and the dummy variable Newly hired indicates that an employee has been
hired in the relevant year. We control for age, age squared, hierarchical level,
functional area, geographic region and company and run separate regressions
for the years 2004 to 2008. Recall that our model made a prediction on the
di⁄erence between the wages of new recruits and incumbents with a similar
previous experience on the labor market. Hence, we restrict the data set to
levels 3 to 6 as we can rule out that there are new recruits without prior
professional experience on these levels.16 The employees￿age then serves as
a proxy for labor market experience.17 Further, heteroskedasticity-robust
15As we exclude levels 1 and 2 (entry levels) in the following regressions, descriptive
statistics for levels 3 to 6 are provided in table A2 in the appendix.
16Levels 1 and 2 are typical entry levels, so there is a large proportion of young graduates
among the newly hired employees. In that case we should expect lower wages for new
recruits as a new recruit should not only have less ￿rm-speci￿c human capital but also
less general human capital. This is indeed con￿rmed by table A3 in the appendix showing
regression results for the two lowest levels.
17We cannot track employees before entering and after leaving a ￿rm and therefore
cannot measure job mobility. But Marshall and Zarkin (1987), for instance, have shown
that prior mobility has neither a signi￿cantly positive nor a signi￿cantly negative impact
12standard errors are reported in each regression.
Dep. variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
Newly hired 0.0130** 0.0491*** 0.0165*** 0.0298*** 0.0282***
(0.0058) (0.0062) (0.0055) (0.0065) (0.0082)
Age 0.0173*** 0.0258*** 0.0273*** 0.0279*** 0.0202***
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Age2￿100 -0.0156*** -0.0241*** -0.0256*** -0.0259*** -0.0173***
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Level 6a 0.667*** 0.654*** 0.690*** 0.670*** 0.673***
(0.0039) (0.0052) (0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0043)
Level 5 0.378*** 0.338*** 0.374*** 0.364*** 0.395***
(0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Level 4 0.189*** 0.160*** 0.184*** 0.171*** 0.179***
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Observations 61694 40248 57021 59724 54147
R-squared 0.72 0.71 0.74 0.70 0.73
Additional control variables include functional area, region and company
a Reference category: Level 3
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 1: Baseline regressions
On average, newly hired employees earn between 1.3% and 4.9% more
than incumbents and these wage premia are highly signi￿cant. The results
also show the typical inversely U-shaped age-earnings pro￿le as well as a
wage structure which is convex in the hierarchical level.
The results show some variation in the magnitude of wage premia dur-
ing the period 2004-2008. As previous research has shown, wages of newly
hired employees are more procyclical and less rigid than those of incumbent
employees.18 Note that this seems to hold also for our data: The spearman
correlation coe¢ cient between average wage premia (i.e. the coe¢ cients for
￿newly hired￿for each of the ￿ve years) and the average return on equity
(return on assets) for German banks is 0.43 (0.44).19 But it is notable that
on wage o⁄ers for newly hired employees.
18See e.g. Devereux and Hart (2006), Haefke et al. (2008), and Pissarides (2009).
19Average return on equity (return on assets) in German banks was 4.2% (0.14%) in
13even in 2008, when banks were severely hit by the ￿nancial crisis, positive
wage premia are paid to newly hired employees.
It is also interesting to investigate the size of wage premia of new recruits
in comparison with employees on the same job with di⁄erent levels of se-
niority. Therefore we classify ￿rm tenure into four groups: The ￿rst includes
only newly hired employees, the second includes incumbents with ￿rm tenure
from 1 to 5 years, the third employees with 6 to 10 years of ￿rm tenure and
the last group comprises employees who work more than 10 years for their
current ￿rm. The results of the regressions including variables for di⁄erent
tenure classes are shown in table 2, with newly hired employees as reference
category. It can be seen that employees with the longest ￿rm tenure face the
strongest disadvantage relative to the new recruits in the same job. In 2007
for example, a newly hired employee earns on average 4% more than an in-
cumbent with 1 to 5 years of tenure. This premia increases up to 5.7% when
comparing to incumbents with more than 10 years of ￿rm tenure.20 Note
that we control for age, job, and ￿rm characteristics. Accordingly, each job
move leads to a wage premium for the mover providing him with a persistent
advantage relative to his colleagues on the same job who have stayed with
the ￿rm for longer periods of time. Hence, in particular the very ￿loyal￿em-
ployees seem to have the strongest disadvantage relative to new hires. These
results are robust over the years.
3.3 The Impact of Organizational Characteristics
Before proceeding to a direct test of our theory it is instructive to conduct
an explorative analysis of organizational determinants of wage premia which
is guided by the key ideas of the model. Given the predictions, the above
results seem to indicate that ￿rm-speci￿c human capital is on average not
too important in the banking industry. However, we might expect di⁄er-
2004, 13% (0.44%) in 2005, 9.4% (0.36%) in 2006, 6.6% (0.25%) in 2007, and -7.7% (-0.3%)
in 2008 (see monthly reports for September 2008 and 2009 of the German Central Bank).
20Note that the weak bene￿ts of tenure are in line with the well-known results by Altonji
and Shakotko (1987) and Abraham and Farber (1987) showing that the e⁄ects of tenure
are rather weak as compared to general labor market experience.
14Dep. variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
Tenure 1-5a -0.0053 -0.0400*** -0.0053 -0.0246*** -0.0186***
(0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0083)
Tenure 6-10 -0.0189*** -0.0524*** -0.0210*** -0.0313*** -0.0275***
(0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0083)
Tenure ￿=11 -0.0345*** -0.0572*** -0.0308*** -0.0370*** -0.0415***
(0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0083)
Observations 61694 40248 57019 59526 54147
R2 0.72 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.74
Additional control variables include age, hierarchical level, functional area,
region and company. a Reference category: Newly hired employees
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 2: OLS wage regressions with tenure classes
ences between the hierarchical levels and functional areas. We can use these
expected di⁄erences as a ￿rst test of the theoretical predictions concerning
the impact of speci￿city.
First of all, managerial skills and talent will become more important
the higher the hierarchical level. But managerial talent is mostly general
human capital.21 As quali￿cations for managerial positions become more
and more similar between ￿rms when an employee climbs up the hierarchy,
our simple model therefore suggests that wage premia for new recruits should
be increasing in the hierarchical level. To test this, we add interaction terms
between each hierarchical level and the Newly hired dummy to the baseline
regression model.
As level 3 is the reference category, the coe¢ cients for the interaction
terms measure the di⁄erence in the new recruits￿wage premia relative to that
premium at level 3. Our hypothesis concerning the e⁄ect of the hierarchical
level on the wage premia is indeed con￿rmed by the results reported in table
21Murphy and ZÆbojn￿k (2004), for instance, have argued that ￿general managerial skills
[..] became relatively more important for the CEO job, perhaps as a result of the steady
progress in economics, management science, accounting, ￿nance, and other disciplines
which, if mastered by a CEO, can substantially improve his ability to manage any company.
At the same time, certain types of knowledge speci￿c to one particular ￿rm [..] is nowadays
available in computerized form at the tip of the CEO￿ s (or his secretary￿ s) ￿ngers.￿
15Dep. variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
Newly hired -0.0159** 0.0010 -0.0337*** -0.0535*** -0.0064
(0.0079) (0.0091) (0.0075) (0.0100) (0.011)
￿ Level 4 0.0468*** 0.0486*** 0.0775*** 0.110*** 0.0138
(0.0118) (0.0122) (0.0110) (0.013) (0.015)
￿ Level 5 0.0285 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.171*** 0.131***
(0.0194) (0.0197) (0.0178) (0.020) (0.027)
￿ Level 6 0.143*** 0.147*** 0.157*** 0.193*** 0.187***
(0.0326) (0.0407) (0.0425) (0.034) (0.061)
Age 0.0171*** 0.0255*** 0.0271*** 0.0275*** 0.0201***
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Age2￿100 -0.0154*** -0.0238*** -0.0253*** -0.0254*** -0.0171***
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Level 6a 0.664*** 0.651*** 0.687*** 0.666*** 0.671***
(0.0040) (0.0053) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0043)
Level 5 0.378*** 0.336*** 0.372*** 0.361*** 0.394***
(0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Level 4 0.188*** 0.160*** 0.183*** 0.169*** 0.179***
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Observations 61694 40248 57021 59724 54147
R-squared 0.72 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.73
Additional control variables include functional area, region and company
a Reference category: Level 3
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 3: Interaction with hierarchical level
3: First note that the coe¢ cient for Newly hired is negative and statistically
signi￿cant in 2005, 2006 and 2008 when the interaction terms are included.
That is on level 3, the lowest level in the data set, newly hired employees earn
less than their incumbent counterparts. This di⁄erence is sizeable at about
-1.6% in 2008, -3.4% in 2006 and -5.4% in 2005, but not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero in 2004 and 2007. However, already on level 4 new recruits receive
a positive wage premium relative to incumbents in all years except 2004.
This premium increases up to 13% at level 5 and further up to 13%-21% at
the highest level.22 For divisional heads, this average premium amounts to




￿ 100 percent in case of dummy variables
1618,000 Euros.
A potential explanation for this pattern is that at the lowest level con-
sidered ￿rm-speci￿c human capital such as the knowledge of ￿rm-speci￿c
software systems, speci￿c banking products and administrative processes is
important such that ￿rms pay less to employees hired from the outside. But
￿rm-speci￿c human capital becomes less important at upper levels in the
hierarchy where general managerial skills are more important. Of course,
there are other explanations for the pattern as well. For instance, workers
at higher hierarchical levels may become more visible to the outside market
and, as in turn adverse selection problems may be smaller, this increases the
willingness to pay for external hires. But in the next section we will provide
strong direct evidence that the importance of speci￿c human capital is a key
driving force.
As in German banks many employees at lower levels are covered by col-
lective wage agreements, which impose restrictions on market wages, it is
important to check whether some of the observed e⁄ects are due to such
agreements. In the regressions reported in table A4 in the appendix we there-
fore exclude all employees covered by a collective wage agreement from the
data set. It is interesting to note that, at the lowest level, the wage discount
for new hires even becomes more negative, indicating that the minimum wage
character of a collective wage agreement seems to favor new recruits relative
to the outcomes of a market-based wage-setting process as analyzed in our
model. At higher levels the results remain unchanged.23
Labor market and job characteristics of course should also di⁄er between
the various functions. Table 4 shows the results of a wage regression where
we explore di⁄erences among the functional areas by interacting the Newly
hired dummy with the di⁄erent functional areas. As reference group we have
chosen retail banking as this is the largest functional area covering more than
30% of all employees. It is quite interesting to note that there are substantial
di⁄erences between the functional areas.
Wage premia are negative and signi￿cant in retail banking in four of the
in semilogarithmic equations (see e.g. Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980)).
23At more senior levels, almost all employees are exempt ones.
17Dependent variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
Asset Managementa 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.138***
(0.0056) (0.0072) (0.0064) (0.0071) (0.0078)
Corporate Banking 0.111*** 0.0689*** 0.0565*** 0.0589*** 0.0342***
(0.0036) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Corp. Production 0.0442*** 0.0418*** 0.0200*** 0.0214*** 0.0181***
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0014)
Corporate Services -0.0209*** -0.0148*** -0.0452*** -0.0236*** -0.0274***
(0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0019)
Investment Banking 0.168*** 0.130*** 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.118***
(0.0058) (0.0073) (0.0057) (0.0066) (0.0067)
Private Banking 0.0886*** 0.0694*** 0.0424*** 0.0226*** 0.0103***
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0018)
Treas. & Cap. Mark. 0.176*** 0.210*** 0.206*** 0.143*** 0.179***
(0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.005)
Newly hired -0.0052 -0.0254*** -0.0346*** -0.0528*** -0.0448**
(0.0137) (0.0097) (0.013) (0.0177) (0.0161)
￿ Asset Man. -0.0053 0.0105 0.0777*** 0.0438 0.0564
(0.0244) (0.0238) (0.0276) (0.0346) (0.0429)
￿ Corp. Bank. 0.0389 0.0387 0.0979*** 0.158*** 0.222***
(0.0286) (0.0311) (0.0250) (0.0295) (0.0552)
￿ Corp. Prod. 0.0064 0.0058 0.0690*** 0.0991*** 0.0707***
(0.0161) (0.0130) (0.0145) (0.0195) (0.0193)
￿ Corp. Serv. -0.0456** -0.0461** 0.0019 0.0619** 0.0470
(0.0217) (0.0230) (0.0220) (0.0300) (0.0313)
￿ Inv. Bank. 0.108*** 0.0779** -0.0008 0.169*** 0.207***
(0.0330) (0.0342) (0.0315) (0.0401) (0.0493)
￿ Priv. Bank. 0.0540** 0.129*** 0.0173 0.0853*** 0.0282
(0.0256) (0.0242) (0.0265) (0.0297) (0.0326)
￿ TCM 0.141*** 0.0543** 0.148*** 0.111*** 0.162***
(0.0322) (0.0265) (0.0301) (0.0294) (0.0384)
Observations 61694 40248 57021 59724 54147
R2 0.72 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.73
Additional control variables include hierarchical level, region, company, age and age2
a Reference category: Retail Banking
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 4: Interaction with functional area
18￿ve years (up to -5.3%). Positive and economically signi￿cant wage premia
can be found in treasury and capital markets in all years, with average pre-
mia that are up to 16% higher than in retail banking. We also ￿nd large and
economically signi￿cant wage premia in the majority of years in corporate
banking and investment banking. Of course, the data must be interpreted
carefully in this respect, but it seems as if the observations may quite well be
understood by the reasoning suggested in our model. In capital market-based
functions employees mainly deal with trading in debt, equity, foreign ex-
change, derivative and money market products that are highly standardized
and therefore very similar or even identical across banks. Hence, acquired
human capital should be mostly general rather than ￿rm-speci￿c. Jobs in
investment banking and corporate banking are often characterized by human
capital that is much more client-speci￿c than ￿rm-speci￿c. But client-speci￿c
human capital is general human capital in the sense that it is very valuable
for a competitor. Hence, ￿rms will be willing to pay high wages to lure in-
vestment and corporate bankers away from their competitors.24 However,
retail banking is concerned with the day-to-day business with less wealthy
private customers where it is important for an employee to be more familiar
with ￿rm-speci￿c products, software and procedures.25
Our data set o⁄ers an additional feature that allows to distinguish be-
tween managers and functional experts. The consultancy Towers Watson
distinguishes between di⁄erent career ladders. The ￿managerial ladder￿in-
cludes employees in supervisory roles with mainly managerial tasks whereas
the ￿professional ladder￿encompasses functional experts. As argued already
in the above, managerial skills should mostly be general human capital. On
the other hand, among the functional experts, ￿rm-speci￿c knowledge should
be on average more important for individual productivity. Hence, we expect
24Examples are UBS recruiting two teams of ￿nancial advisors from Merrill Lynch in
2009, both managing in total around $500 million of client assets (Reuters, November 19,
2010) or Deutsche Bank which lured away a group of more than 10 investment bankers
from Merrill Lynch (Financial Times, April 7 2009).
25Note that new recruits earn relatively more in private banking than in retail banking.
Private banking deals with wealthy private clients. In this case hiring employees from
competitors should be more attractive as they bring more valuable client relations with
them.
19that wage premia for external recruits are higher when we consider jobs in
the managerial ladder as compared to the professional ladder. This is con-
￿rmed in the regressions reported in table A5 in the Appendix. An employee
in the managerial ladder receives a 3.6% to 6.9% higher premium than a
comparable employee in the professional ladder.
3.4 The Importance of Firm-Speci￿c Human Capital
So far we found some evidence for our key hypothesis and argued that ￿rm-
speci￿c human capital should be less important at higher levels, for certain
functional areas and less important for managerial as compared to expert
positions. In this section we develop a procedure to provide a more direct
test for the hypothesis. To do that we follow a two-step approach: In a
￿rst step, we generate a measure for the importance of ￿rm-speci￿c human
capital. In a second step we then investigate whether the size of this measure
in fact determines the di⁄erence between the wages of incumbents and newly
hired employees.
The speci￿city measure is de￿ned as follows. We ￿rst generate cells as
unique combinations of the speci￿c function26, hierarchical level and career
ladder for each year in the data set. This re￿ ects the idea that the importance
of human capital is rather function- and job-speci￿c than company-speci￿c,
i.e. in many areas ￿rm-speci￿c human capital is of the same importance
across di⁄erent companies. As a result, we obtain between 380 and 435
unique cells per year. In a next step we conduct separate regressions for
the years 2004 to 2008 for each of these cells with the individual perfor-
mance measure (logarithm of bonus payments) as dependent variable and
￿rm tenure and age as explanatory variables.27 The coe¢ cient sj of ￿rm
tenure in each regression now gives a measure for the importance of ￿rm-
speci￿c human capital in a cell j: The more important ￿rm-speci￿c human
capital in a certain area the more the performance of an employee should de-
pend upon his tenure at the ￿rm controlling for overall experience (proxied
26The data set distinguishes depending on the year between 60 and 80 speci￿c functions.
27In line with our previous analyses we do not make use of entry levels 1 and 2. We also
exclude cells with insu¢ cient observations.
20by age).
We then standardize this measure by generating a variable equal to the
cumulative distribution function F (sj) of this measure for each cell, i.e. the
fraction of all cells in which the impact of tenure on performance is smaller.
Hence, for the cell with the lowest tenure coe¢ cient this speci￿city measure
F (sj) takes on the value 0; for that with the highest coe¢ cient it is close
to 1 and for the median cell it is 0:5. For each year we separately estimate
the following speci￿cation with again the wage of individual i who belongs
to cell j (i) as dependent variable




￿ NewHirei + ￿3 ￿ Xi + "i;
with Xi being a vector of independent variables, i.e. age and dummies for
the hierarchical level, functional area, region, and company. We estimate this
model separately for each cross section.
According to our theoretical model we expect ￿1 to be positive and the
sign of the interaction term ￿2 to be negative, because wage premia should be
lower in areas where human capital is more ￿rm-speci￿c. Table 5 shows the
estimation results. We indeed ￿nd a signi￿cant negative interaction e⁄ect for
all years, i.e. the wage premium for newly hired employees is economically
as well as statistically signi￿cant when ￿rm-speci￿c human capital is not
important. In these areas, new hires receive an average premium between
8% and 12%, all other factors constant. But this premium decreases in those
areas where speci￿c human capital is of high importance. At the median of
speci￿city the wage premia are about half the size. Interestingly, while in
three of the ￿ve years we observe negative premia for new hires in areas with
the highest degree of speci￿city (i.e. ￿1+￿2 < 0) these premia are very close
to zero. It is notable that the results are remarkably similar in the considered
years (with the slight exception of 2005, in which the estimated speci￿city
e⁄ect is weaker).
As a further robustness check we compare the wage premia for newly
hired employees between areas with above- and below-median values for the
speci￿city of human capital. To test the di⁄erences between these groups,
21Dep. variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
New hire 0.0793*** 0.0851*** 0.0816*** 0.1141*** 0.0913***
(0.0191) (0.0231) (0.0277) (0.0211) (0.0145)
New hire ￿ -0.0988*** -0.0815** -0.0990** -0.0642* -0.1191***
HC Speci￿citya (0.0376) (0.0395) (0.0478) (0.0370) (0.0271)
Human Capital -0.0097*** -0.0154*** -0.0248*** -0.0498*** -0.0188***
Speci￿citya (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0028)
Observations 58931 35718 49486 51683 50542
R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.73
a Standardized measure (distribution function). Additional control variables include
hierarchical level, age, region, functional area and company
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 5: Interaction with measure for speci￿city of human capital




> 0:5. As expected, in all
years average wage premia for the below-median group are highly signi￿cant
and larger than those for the above-median group. The wage premia range
from 7% to 9% in areas with below-median speci￿city, and from 1% to 6%
otherwise.
3.5 Di⁄erences in Ability?
In the regressions presented in the above we compared newly hired employees
with incumbents of the same age, hierarchical level, functional area, region
and company. But there might be further and unobservable di⁄erences in
individual characteristics. For instance, if ￿rms would systematically re-
cruit employees from the outside that are of higher ability than incumbent
employees in the same jobs, wage premia may to a certain extent re￿ ect pro-
ductivity premia.28 Hence it is important to rule out that wage premia are
mainly driven by a potential omitted variable bias as individual ability is
unobserved.
Note that it is not appropriate to estimate a ￿xed e⁄ects model with
28Still note that it seems hard to come up with a compelling theoretical argument why
this should be the case in equilibrium. It should not be possible for all ￿rms in a market
to hire employees that are of higher ability than the incumbents.
22a dummy for newly hired employees as independent variable. Given the
structure of our data, a ￿xed e⁄ects model would identify the e⁄ects of a
within employee variation in wages between year 1 in the ￿rm as compared
to later years in the ￿rm. But we want to investigate the di⁄erence in wages
between newly hired employees and employees doing exactly the same job.
Dep. variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2007 2006 2005 2004
Newly hired 0.0467*** 0.0132 0.0374*** 0.0464***
(0.0098) (0.0087) (0.0102) (0.0143)
Ability measure 0.0321*** 0.0315*** 0.0182*** 0.0165***
(0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0009)
Level 6a 0.661*** 0.574*** 0.666*** 0.611***
(0.0104) (0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0088)
Level 5 0.385*** 0.290*** 0.348*** 0.355***
(0.0047) (0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0046)
Level 4 0.188*** 0.150*** 0.159*** 0.150***
(0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0030)
Observations 10420 15251 19109 12857
R-squared 0.76 0.72 0.75 0.70
Additional control variables include age, functional area, region
and company. a Reference category: Level 3
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 6: Baseline regressions with individual ability measure
But our data set still provides us with the possibility to control for hetero-
geneity in abilities, as we can (i) observe individual annual bonus payments
and (ii) can construct a panel data set by matching individuals in the cross
sections for about one third of all employees in our sample.29 This panel
data set contains identical information to that used in the cross sections and
the distribution of employees across hierarchical levels and functional areas is
very similar. We construct our measure for individual, time-constant ability
as follows: First we estimate the following ￿xed e⁄ects regression with the
29The reason is that some but not all companies in the data set reported a time-invariant
unique (anonymous) personal ID number for each employee in each year.
23logarithm of bonus payments as dependent variable:
lnbit = ￿ ￿ Xit + ai + "it;
with Xit being a vector of the independent variables, i.e. the logarithm of
base salary, a dummy for newly hired employees30, tenure, age, as well as
dummies for the hierarchical level, functional area, region, company, and
year and ai the individual ￿xed e⁄ects. Note that we only include employ-
ees with information from at least two subsequent years in the regressions.
We then use the individual predictions for the estimated ￿xed e⁄ects ai as
measure of ability for individual i and replicate the baseline regressions ad-
ditionally controlling for ai. The results are given in table 6. Note that the
coe¢ cients are very close to those reported in table 1 even though we now
have a much lower number of observations.31 Hence, the wage premia seem
not to be driven by systematic di⁄erences in ability between incumbents and
new recruits.
Dep. variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2007 2006 2005 2004
New hire 0.0794*** 0.1104*** 0.0733*** 0.0841***
(0.0252) (0.0333) (0.0211) (0.0241)
New hire -0.0753* -0.1291** -0.0070 -0.0963**
￿ HC Spec.a (0.0434) (0.0573) (0.0385) (0.0420)
HC Spec.a -0.0110 -0.0300*** -0.0378*** -0.0435***
(0.0067) (0.0051) (0.0040) (0.0056)
Ability measure 0.0456*** 0.0687*** 0.0558*** 0.0542***
(0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0027)
Observations 10115 14509 19117 11874
R-squared 0.77 0.72 0.76 0.71
a Standardized measure (distribution function). Additional control variables
include hierarchical level, age, region, functional area and company
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 7: Speci￿city of human capital and individual ability
30The results are even stronger when we omit this dummy.
31We also use future individual wage increases as further productivity measure, which
con￿rms the results presented here.
24We also replicate the results for the measure of the speci￿city of human
capital, additionally controlling for individual ability. Even though we can
again only use a subsample of observations, the results in table 7 are mainly
robust compared to the estimates in table 5.
4 Conclusion
The key purpose of the paper was to explore wage di⁄erences between incum-
bents and newly hired employees on the same job. We started by analyzing a
model in which ￿rms compete for the service of employees and an employee￿ s
decision to stay with his current employer depends on the wages o⁄ered as
well as his personal current job satisfaction. Uncertainty about job satisfac-
tion in a new ￿rm leads to switching costs. In turn, ￿rms will o⁄er higher
wages to new recruits than they pay to comparable incumbents when ￿rm-
speci￿c human capital is mainly general. If, however, ￿rm-speci￿c human
capital is more important a competitor￿ s willingness to pay is lower than
the value of the employee for the current employer and the wage premia for
new recruits should be smaller. If speci￿c human capital is very important
incumbent employees may even earn more than new recruits on the same
position.
We then examined these predictions empirically using a large data set
on wages in German banks and ￿nancial services companies which contains
much more detailed information on the type of the jobs as compared to typi-
cal linked employer-employee data sets. We found that newly hired employees
earn substantially more than incumbents in the same position at higher lev-
els of the hierarchy. Moreover, these hiring premia are larger in functional
areas where human capital is apparently often client-speci￿c rather than
￿rm-speci￿c as well as in managerial positions. Indeed, we were able to show
that a measure for the importance of speci￿c human capital substantially
a⁄ects the size of the wage premia. Moreover, wage premia are not driven by
systematic di⁄erences in individual abilities between incumbents and newly
hired employees.
Our study thus shows that ￿rms typically (have to) pay more when poach-
25ing employees from competitors. In turn, new hires on average earn more
than equally able incumbents on the same job. An important implication of
the result is that ￿rms must earn rents from working with incumbents. This
supports the claim put forward in the literature on internal labor markets
that companies are indeed able to shield their incumbent employees from
external market forces. But the extent to which this happens di⁄ers strongly
between di⁄erent types of jobs. A key determinant we investigated in this
paper is the speci￿city of human capital. But other job characteristics such
as the external visibility of talent should matter as well. It is an interest-
ing task for future research to explore the importance and interplay of these
di⁄erent driving forces.
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33Dep. variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
Newly hired -0.0604*** -0.0469*** -0.0394*** -0.0243*** -0.0235***
(0.0051) (0.0059) (0.0051) (0.0066) (0.0053)
Age 0.0321*** 0.0319*** 0.0427*** 0.0412*** 0.0405***
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.00043) (0.00046) (0.00047)
Age2￿100 -0.0344*** -0.0341*** -0.0470*** -0.0452*** -0.0443***
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.00056) (0.00059) (0.00061)
Level 2a 0.173*** 0.198*** 0.141*** 0.163*** 0.178***
(0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Observations 34874 25187 33938 34588 33738
R2 0.63 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.67
Additional control variables include functional area, region and company
a Reference category Level 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table A3: OLS wage regressions regarding only entry levels 1 and 2
34Dep. variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
Newly hired -0.0208 0.0081 -0.0558*** -0.0854*** -0.0234
(0.0153) (0.0133) (0.0125) (0.019) (0.018)
￿ Level 4 0.0537* 0.0571*** 0.0963*** 0.143*** 0.0400*
(0.0304) (0.0201) (0.0145) (0.020) (0.021)
￿ Level 5 0.0069 0.155*** 0.140*** 0.194*** 0.133***
(0.0413) (0.0324) (0.0203) (0.026) (0.031)
￿ Level 6 0.295*** 0.115** 0.190*** 0.230*** 0.210***
(0.0638) (0.0576) (0.0457) (0.037) (0.067)
Age 0.0270*** 0.0330*** 0.0204*** 0.0234*** 0.0164***
(0.0001) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.00078)
Age2￿100 -0.0260*** -0.0316*** -0.0066*** -0.0195*** -0.0128***
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.00091)
Level 6a 0.608*** 0.635*** 0.603*** 0.624*** 0.634***
(0.0112) (0.0089) (0.0045) (0.0051) (0.0043)
Level 5 0.363*** 0.305*** 0.297*** 0.331*** 0.360***
(0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0022)
Level 4 0.187*** 0.136*** 0.127*** 0.158*** 0.146***
(0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0015)
Observations 16553 13933 37715 38851 44172
R-squared 0.69 0.72 0.68 0.65 0.74
Additional control variables include functional area, region and company in all speci￿cations
a Reference category: Level 3
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table A4: OLS wage regressions excluding employees covered by a collective
wage agreement
35Dep. variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
Newly hired 0.0122* 0.0469*** 0.0322*** 0.0357*** 0.0353***
(0.0065) (0.0068) (0.0062) (0.0071) (0.0094)
Newly hired ￿ 0.0349** 0.0568*** 0.0413** 0.0666*** 0.0499*
Management (0.0166) (0.0213) (0.0181) (0.0207) (0.030)
Management 0.1078*** 0.1402*** 0.1353*** 0.1341*** 0.1109***
(0.0020) (0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0033)
Age 0.0183*** 0.0228*** 0.0227*** 0.0244*** 0.0216***
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Age2￿100 -0.0162*** -0.0202*** -0.0197*** -0.0214*** -0.0183***
(0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010)
Level 6a 0.619*** 0.573*** 0.601*** 0.598*** 0.609***
(0.0040) (0.0056) (0.0045) (0.0049) (0.0047)
Level 5 0.357*** 0.317*** 0.346*** 0.340*** 0.369***
(0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0026)
Level 4 0.184*** 0.159*** 0.183*** 0.170*** 0.178***
(0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0018)
Observations 45242 28098 39962 41776 37782
R-squared 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.71 0.73
Additional control variables include functional area, region and company
a Reference category: Level 3
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table A5: Interaction with career ladder
36